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By now everyone has heard that the computer is
remaking the law, but there is little agreement on
what this means. Some advocates of the new technology insist that whole bodies of law, including
copyright and anti-obscenity legislation, must be
abandoned outright in the new territory of cyberspace.' Most legal scholars reject these claims and
expect the law to accommodate computer technology in the same incremental way that it absorbed other social and technological changesthrough judicial reasoning by analogy within the
framework of existing law, supplemented by new
legislation where necessary. 2 In deciding where
new rules are needed and what those rules should
say, however, lawyers, legislators, judges and legal
scholars may be made timid-or, if they are bold,
dangerous-by their uncertain grasp of computer
technology.
Curtis E.A. Karnow believes that the challenges
posed by computer technology are very large indeed, and he brings to this vexed subject a rare
combination of intellectual subtlety and technical
knowledge. Future Codes collects Karnow's reflections on a diverse set of subjects including computer crime, intellectual property, electronic privacy, the First Amendment, education in the
electronic age and the loss of common sense as a
workable legal norm. 3 If a collection of essays as
diverse as this one can be said to have a single
theme, it is that the legal problems of computer
technology call for what all legal problems de* Mr. Kennedy is of counsel to Morrison & Foerster LLP
and co-author of the forthcoming treatise, Modern
Communications Law (from West Publishing Company).
I See, e.g., Egbert J. Dommering, Copyright Being Washed
away through the Digital Sieve, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN
A DIGITAL ENVWRONMENT (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996);
John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: a Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the DigitalAge (Everything You
Know about Intellectual Property is Wrong), WIRED, Mar., 1984 p.

mand and too rarely get: common-sense rules
backed by efficient dispute-resolution mechanisms. Accordingly, Karnow proposes practical as
well as theoretical solutions to the challenges that
computer technology poses to existing law.
Karnow predicts, for example, that advanced
computers - and especially computer networks
designed to handle several problems concurrently
and recommend, or even execute, solutions to
those problems - will come to complicate the
chain of proximate cause by which the law traditionally links human actions to harmful consequences. To illustrate his point, Karnow asks us to
consider a fictitious system, known as Alef, that replaces the present combination of human and
electronic air traffic control methods with a distributed network of airborne and ground-based
data processing devices, all connected in a network with a constantly changing complement of
nodes and connections. Alef routes traffic and
"[i]n emergencies, as Alef perceives
them, . .

.

may control individual aircraft to pre-

vent collisions. '4 The problem is that Alef, like
human agents, can draw incorrect conclusions
from the information it receives, and those errors
may not be foreseeable by those who designed
Alef's hardware or software. These errors may not
be an argument against deploying Alef: some irreducible percentage of mistakes may be inevitable
in a system employing machine judgment-just as
some irreducible percentage of errors is unavoid84.

2
For a notable example of this approach, see Leon E.
Wein, The Responsibility of intelligent Artifacts: Toward an AutomationJurisprudence,6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103 (1992).
3 CURTIS E.A. KARNow, FUTURE CODES: ESSAYS IN ADVANCED COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW (1997) [hereinafter Karnow].
4 Id. at 172.
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able in a system dependent on human judgment-and Alef's track record may be better than
that of the human agents it replaced. So we want
Alef; but how are we to compensate victims of its
failures of machine intelligence? We cannot leave
victims without a remedy; yet if we make Alef's
human designers liable for harms they could not
foresee or prevent, only fools will become involved in the design of intelligent agents.
Karnow sees this dilemma as an ideal occasion
for a no-fault insurance scheme, and he proposes
that developers of intelligent agents apply for certification with an institution he calls, aptly
enough, the Turing Registry. 5 The Registry will
evaluate the risk posed by the intelligent agent
and quote a rate for issuance of an insurance certificate. Upon payment of the premium, the
holder of the certificate will be entitled to insert
an encrypted warranty in the agent that will protect the owners and operators of sites at which the
agent will be used. When a registered agent
causes harm through an error in machine judgment, the Registry will compensate the victims
with no need to assign blame to human beings.
Karnow shows similar creativity in addressing
the privacy of personal communications sent over
the Internet-a complex question to which current law offers only spotty answers. Karnow does
not trust laws intended to limit the dissemination
of personal information about real persons. 6 Instead, he suggests that people can control the dissemination of information about themselves more
effectively by creating electronic alter egos, which
he calls electronic personalities or "epers," that
will transact business in cyberspace on behalf of
their anonymous human progenitors. Like corporations and partnerships, epers will be created
through the observance of suitable legal formali-

ties. Also like corporations and partnerships,
epers will have identities and legal rights separate
from those of their creators. Epers will "own physical property and maintain bank accounts, enter
into contracts, and be recognized as authors of ex7
pression subject to constitutional protection.
Epers that live up to their commitments will acquire reputations for reliability and will be treated
accordingly. Epers that behave badly - by violating copyright or publishing defamation - may be
sued for their misconduct. Where a court finds
that the protection of the eper has been misused,
plaintiffs may "pierce the veil" and reach the real
persons behind the fiction, as plaintiffs do now
when suing those who have misused the corporate
form to commit fraud.8
Karnow's eper is an arresting concept, but one
that presents many questions. Notably, the eper
protects the identity of real persons and makes it
more difficult for victims of their criminal and tortious conduct to secure redress. This need not be
a shocking result: the corporate form also shields
owners from personal liability for harmful acts of
the corporation. But society secures enormous
economic benefits in exchange for immunizing
corporate investors. Does anonymity on the Internet confer social benefits of comparable magnitude? This question should be answered before
the legal system mobilizes to create and protect a
new kind of fictitious entity.9
As these examples suggest, Future Codes is not a
novice's introduction to the legal problems of
computer technology. It is a series of personal even idiosyncratic - reflections on the subject by a
refined and original mind.10 For those who already have absorbed more conventional treatments of the subject and are ready for something
more robust, this book is highly recommended.

5 Alan Mathison Turing (1912-54), a British mathematician, did pioneering work in computer logic and is credited
with devising the formal structure of the electronic computer. Turing proposed a famous test for artificial intelligence: if human monitors of a conversation between a person and a computer are unable to distinguish the human
responses from the machine responses, then the computer
has achieved artificial intelligence.

dressed to the holder of the key.
9 In fact, if there is a good case for epers, that case could

6 Id. at 131 n. 38.
7 Id. at 128.
8 The veil apparently will be pierced when the identity of
the principal behind the eper, formerly protected by use of
public key encryption, is disclosed pursuant to an order ad-

have been made before the advent of electronic communications. The desire to communicate and transact business
anonymously certainly antedates the Internet, but our legal
system has never - to this reviewer's knowledge-sanctioned
the creation of a fictitious legal entity expressly for that purpose.
1) Karnow also can be quite humorous. His review of
Richard A. Lanham's The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts (University of Chicago, 1993) is hilarious. See
Karnow, supra note 3, at 241.

